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Introduction and summary
The Second Bank of the United States (1817–36) was
chartered by the federal government for a 20-year pe-
riod and it resembled a modern central bank in its close
relationship with the U.S. Treasury and paramount po-
sition in the nation’s banking system.1 It was conceived
in response to a fiscal crisis during and following the
War of 1812. The bank’s charter had a tortuous legis-
lative history, and there was intense political and judicial
controversy throughout the bank’s existence, culminat-
ing in the “War on the Bank” by President Andrew
Jackson and the ultimate refusal of Congress to renew
its charter.2 The “Panic of 1819” was a banking crisis
and economic contraction that was blamed (rightly or
wrongly) on tight credit policy that the bank had im-
posed in order to recover its solvency after mismanage-
ment in its early days of operation. The subsequent
period, 1819–32, was characterized by prosperity and
stability on the whole, but there were some minor fi-
nancial crises that did not have apparent causes. Finally,
some contemporary observers and historians have ar-
gued that actions taken by the national bank during
the Jacksonian “war” may have partly caused the “Panic
of 1837,” another banking crisis and economic con-
traction, which occurred shortly after the Second Bank
of the United States lost its federal charter.
The consensus among historians is that the Sec-
ond Bank of the United States (which I call the U.S.
Bank for short) was politically controversial because
it involved an expansion of federal powers that many
Americans in that day resisted on general principle; and
because the monetary discipline that it was designed
to impose on state-chartered banks was costly to those
banks and thus engendered a powerful industry lobby
in opposition to it. A predominant view (emphasized
particularly by Hammond, 1957) is that, while various
classes of indebted persons often expressed hostility
to the bank and were sometimes mobilized to support
politicians who opposed it, those debtor constituencies
were not the mainspring of opposition. On the whole,
other historians do not dispute Hammond’s view. It is
generally thought that, in fact, the U.S. Bank did not
act in a predatory way toward the state banks.3 Regard-
ing the economic management of the bank, there is wide
agreement that there was disastrous mismanagement dur-
ing the first two years of operation but, after a change
of leadership, very capable management subsequently.
The thesis of this article is that conflict between
debtors and creditors regarding economic policy may
have played a large role, both politically and economi-
cally, throughout the history of the U.S. Bank. This
conclusion is only tentative. It rests on some theoreti-
cal premises that are plausible but not yet rigorously
proven. If they are valid, historical research suggested
by their implications may overturn them nevertheless.
However, if correct, this explanation can account for
four aspects of the history of the U.S. Bank that other
explanations have not addressed convincingly: 1) Why
a large number of legislators changed positions, in both
directions, during the debate on the charter; 2) Why a
demonstrably incompetent president and some venal
senior managers were initially selected; 3) Why states
whose legislators had eventually supported issuance of
the U.S. Bank charter shifted to oppose the bank after
capable and honest management was installed; and
4) Why several, relatively minor, financial crises oc-
curred during the period while the bank was capably
managed and before the conflict about renewing its
charter reached its apex.
The interpretation of the U.S. Bank offered here
rests on theoretical premises about two related matters.
One is the relationship between the structure of the bank-
ing industry in an economy and the macroeconomic60 1Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
performance of that economy, particularly in times of
high inflation and banking crises. The other is the na-
ture of voters’ preferences over those macroeconomic
outcomes, and the way in which political institutions
translate those preferences into legislation or regula-
tion that affects the structure of the banking industry.
I discuss these matters in turn in the following two
sections. Then I provide an overview of the history of
the U.S. Bank and discuss how the theories outlined in
this article shed some light on the bank’s performance.
Premises about banking structure and
macroeconomic performance
The analysis to be offered here is based on the im-
plications for macroeconomic performance of whether
or not banks’ criteria for making loans and for issuing
money are set centrally. I call a banking system uni-
fied if those criteria are set centrally and divided oth-
erwise. An economy has a unified banking system if
it has either a monopoly bank (or a bank capable of
maintaining a position of industry dominance) with
strong central management or a public authority that sets
and enforces industry-wide standards to which all banks
must adhere. An economy has a divided banking system
if it has many banks and they are not effectively regu-
lated or, alternatively, if it is dominated by a single,
unregulated bank, but the branches of that bank have
substantial independence from the head office. I argue
later in this article that the U.S. Bank itself was a divid-
ed banking system of the latter type, and that the U.S.
financial system as a whole was divided both for this
reason and also because of the survival of the state-char-
tered banks (a divided system of the former type).
This section provides a sketch of a theory (that is,
what economists call a reduced-form model) of banking
equilibrium. In the theory, lending and money creation
are conflated (treated as one variable) and high infla-
tion and banking crises are also conflated. Although
lending and money creation technically are related (be-
cause net money creation by a bank is the excess of the
amount of loans it makes plus the amount of notes it
issues over the amount of deposits it takes), what is rel-
evant for this sketch is that lending and money creation
are both banking activities that are profitable and so-
cially beneficial in moderation, but that can be over-
done in the sense of making imprudent, risky loans or
issuing more monetary claims than may be possible
to honor if demand for redemption is high. Overdoing
lending or money creation causes some economic loss,
often involving a banking crisis or an episode of high
inflation. These two forms of loss have the common
feature that a single bank or group of banks can cause
a loss to the banking industry and the economy as a
whole, not only to itself. (An economist would say
the offending bank imposes a negative externality on
the industry and the economy.)
I sketch arguments for the following three conclu-
sions, which I adopt as premises in my subsequent anal-
ysis of the U.S. Bank. Of course, given the heuristic
character of these arguments, one should regard them
as merely approximate ideas about the macroeconomic
implications of alternative banking-industry structures.
■ Excessive lending and money creation are avoided
in the equilibrium of a unified banking industry.
■ A divided banking industry has a static equilibrium,
in which excessive lending and/or money creation
are the norm and the industry consequently suffers
ongoing losses due to crises and/or high inflation.4
■ A divided banking industry may also have a dynam-
ic equilibrium, in which excessive lending and mon-
ey creation, and consequent losses due to crises and
high inflation, are avoided on the whole. If banks’
decisions are not directly observable by one another
and if occasionally there are economic circumstanc-
es (such as a run on an individual bank or an uptick
in inflation) that banks might impute—rightly or
wrongly—to excessive lending or money creation
by their competitors, then there may be episodic
“industry wars,” in which such excessive activity
does temporarily take place, with attendant losses
to the industry until normal conduct is restored.5
Some simple algebra is helpful to derive these re-
sults. Consider an activity that a bank can do to excess.
Let x denote the amount of excess activity in which each
bank engages and X denote the aggregate amount of ex-
cess activity in the banking industry. Suppose that a bank
makes revenue of ρ per unit of its own excess activity
and that it incurs cost of λ per unit of excess activity in
the industry. That is, if a bank’s excess activity is x and
the industry’s excess activity is X, then the bank’s profit is
π(x, X) = ρx − λX.
From the perspective of the bank in question, the
industry level of excess activity is the sum of that due
to itself and that due to all other banks. Let x* denote
the level due to the other banks, so that  X = x + x*. Think
of a unified banking industry as an industry consisting
of a single bank, so that x* = 0 in a unified industry.
Now the profit of a bank can be rewritten as
π(x, X) = ρx – λ(x + x*) = (ρ – λ)x – λx*.
Make the assumption that a bank chooses its level of
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to how its choice will influence the choices of its com-
petitors. (Economists call this the Cournot–Nash
equilibrium assumption.) On this assumption, a bank
will not engage in excess activity (that is, will set x = 0)
if ρ<λ but will engage in as much excess activity as
possible if ρ>λ. Call this the static equilibrium of the
banking industry. For convenience, assume that there
is a finite, positive maximum level of  x excess activity.
If ρ>λ, then the static equilibrium is for every bank
to set  . xx =
In a unified industry, profit maximization by the
single bank is the same thing as profit maximization
by the industry. In a divided industry, however, they
may diverge. To see this, consider an industry with two
banks, 1 and 2. Let x1 and x2, respectively, denote the
excess-activity levels of banks 1 and 2. Under the as-
sumption that ρ>λ,  12 . xx x == Total industry profit
is the sum of the profits of the two banks, which is
2(, 2) 2 4 . xx x x π= ρ − λ  Consider, for example, ρ = 3
and λ = 2. Then ρ>λ, so  x  is each bank’s individual
profit-maximizing choice, so the total industry profit
is  20 . x −< If both banks had refrained from excess
activity, then total industry profit would have been 0.
That is, in this example, the individual profit-maximi-
zation decisions of banks do not lead collectively to
the maximum feasible level of industry profit.6
Bankers in a divided industry might try to achieve
informal coordination to mitigate the loss that they
would collectively suffer in static equilibrium. The on-
going nature of their relationship as competitors, which
is ignored in the above explanation of why each of
them would rationally decide to participate in the static
equilibrium, can provide a way out of their dilemma.7
For specificity, continue to assume that ρ = 3 and λ = 2.
Also assume that the bankers make choices at each
date 0, 1, 2 ... and that they discount future profits by
factor δ between 0 and 1. That is, if a banker chooses
excess activity xt at each date t and the total industry
level of excess activity is Xt, then the banker’s discount-




= ∑ δπ  To reformulate the assump-
tion that bankers neglect the effect of their own choices
on their competitors’ choices in a way that takes ex-
plicit account of their repeated information, assume
that bankers neglect the effect of their own choices on
their competitors’ simultaneous choices, but that each
banker recognizes that competitors can base their cur-
rent choices on information or inference about the
banker’s past choices.
Now consider a divided industry consisting of two
banks, and think about an implicit or explicit agreement
between the bankers to refrain initially from excess
action (that is, to set x0 = 0), but to switch irrevocably
to the static equilibrium level (that is,  Xx = ) after
observing an apparent violation of the agreement. For
the moment, assume that bankers accurately observe
one another’s choices.
Consider whether the bankers have incentive to hon-
or this agreement. If all do honor it, then each banker re-
ceives discounted profit 0. Consider a banker who decided
to violate the agreement, say at date 0, by setting x0 > 0.
The banker’s profit at date 0 would be (ρ – λ) x0 = x0.
Thereafter, in the ensuing static equilibrium, the bank-
er’s profit each period is  2. xx x ρ−λ= −  The banker’s
discounted profit from violating the agreement is thus
01 0 ( /(1 )) ((1 2 ) /(1 )) .
t
t xx x x x
∞
= −∑ δ=− δ − δ ≤ − δ − δ  If
δ > 1/2, then the discounted profit from violating the
agreement is negative and, therefore, the banker has an
incentive to keep the agreement. Call such an incen-
tive-compatible agreement a dynamic equilibrium.
If δ > 1/2, then it is really not necessary to switch
to static equilibrium forever. Maintaining the static equi-
librium for a sufficiently long time and then refraining
again from excess activity (that is, replacing ∞ by a suf-
ficiently large, finite, upper limit of the discounted sum
of profits) would preserve incentive compatibility.
Now suppose that bankers do not directly observe
one another’s choices, but that rather they observe
some indirect evidence that is subject to occasional,
random, disturbances. In particular, although all bankers
are keeping their agreement, they sometimes receive
the sort of evidence (such as an uptick of inflation or
a spate of withdrawals by depositors) that would or-
dinarily result from a violation. When this occurs, then
all the bankers will revert to static equilibrium for a
finite period and subsequently return to cooperation.
If the errors are sufficiently rare, then the inequality
of discounted profits that determines incentive com-
patibility of the agreement will be almost identical to
the corresponding inequality that has just been derived
for an industry where bankers observe one another’s
choices directly, and this inequality will hold in expected-
value terms. That is, in an industry where such obser-
vation errors occasionally occur, dynamic equilibrium
will exhibit a pattern of cooperation that is occasion-
ally broken but always repaired after a while. During
the breaks, however, banks will lend or create money
in excess, and banking crises or high inflation will
sometimes result.
Premises about voters’ policy preferences
Banking crises and high inflation affect the gen-
eral public, as well as the banking industry. In most
macroeconomic models, all persons are identically sit-
uated and there is a unanimous preference for bank-
ing stability and low inflation (or even slight deflation).
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identically situated. In particular, some people tend to
be in debt most of the time (although they may need
to pay off their debts periodically to remain credit-
worthy), while some others are debt free and even hold
bonds. It is plausible that such choices are often robust
(that is, they would not be reversed by small changes
in wealth, interest rates, and so forth) and that they are
rational in light of people’s endowments, preferences,
and so on. Strictly speaking, whether to borrow or to
lend is a choice that a person makes in credit-market
equilibrium, rather than a characteristic of the person.
Nevertheless, I use the terms debtor and creditor here
to refer to people whose characteristics lead them ra-
tionally and robustly to be either debtors or creditors
throughout most of their lives.
I use the following premises about people’s—and
specifically voters’—life-cycle credit positions and con-
sequent policy preferences in analyzing the history of
the U.S. Bank.
■ There are both debtors and creditors in the economy.
■ Debtors tend to favor positive inflation and are will-
ing to tolerate some risk of a banking crisis in return
for “easy” credit, while creditors favor price stability
or deflation and are averse to risk of a banking crisis.
Wallace (1984) emphasizes the significance of these
premises (as they apply to inflation, not banking crises)
for monetary policy. He provides an economic model
that conforms to the first premise and that also conforms
approximately to the second. (Holders of money in
the initial generation of Wallace’s overlapping-gener-
ations model, rather than creditors, are the group that
is averse to inflation.) A subsequent model that resembles
Wallace’s, and that can be shown to conform exactly
to the second premise (for inflation), is the prototypical
model of a debt security in Green (1997), diagrammed
in that paper in figure 2. The key to why these models
generate disparate preferences regarding inflation is that
steady-state inflation is an outcome of steady-state mon-
ey growth that depresses the real interest rate, and that
debtors prefer a low real rate while creditors prefer a
high real rate. Dependence of the real interest rate on the
rate of steady-state money growth contrasts with typical
models in which the real interest rate is assumed to
be constant or to be determined by non-monetary factors.
I am not aware of any studies that confirm either
of the premises directly. Direct confirmation could be
made, in principle, from a large set of observations
tracking households’ credit histories throughout their
lifetimes and including characteristics that might pre-
dict disposition to be debtors or creditors. Short of
analyzing such a dataset, it is still possible to obtain
partial and indirect confirmation. Hendricks (2002) may
be seen as providing this.8 Hendricks begins by pro-
viding corroboration of two previously observed facts:
that there is tremendous wealth inequality between
households with similar lifetime incomes, and that this
inequality persists across generations. He then shows
that these facts are inconsistent with a life-cycle con-
sumption model, which represents all households as
being essentially identical (with wealthier households
being scaled-up copies of less wealthy ones), even when
modifications are made to account for intergenerational
transfers, differences in time preference, and random
opportunities for entrepreneurial investment. He con-
cludes that life-cycle models lack an important source
of wealth inequality.
Hendricks does not pinpoint the situation postu-
lated in the first premise, but the premise can fit his
needs. Notably, if there is a segment of households with
income that increases predictably over time and with
relatively age-independent consumption preferences,
while other households’ income is a constant or de-
creasing function of age, then the increasing-income
households would maximize utility subject to their life-
time-budget constraints by borrowing when young and
repaying with their higher income when old. In con-
trast, other households with the same total lifetime in-
come would save and subsequently spend their savings,
or simply consume their income if they had time-con-
stant income, and so would not go into debt. That is,
the increasing-income households would have nega-
tive wealth throughout their lives, while other house-
holds would have nonnegative wealth. Moreover, under
the plausible assumptions that whether income is in-
creasing or decreasing as a function of age is correlated
with occupation and that occupation is intergeneration-
ally correlated, the resulting wealth inequality will
also be correlated. Thus Hendricks’ findings provide
support for the first premise.9
The preceding discussion has entirely concerned
inflation and has not mentioned banking crises, to which
the second premise refers. The notion that creditors (that
is, bankers and depositors in banks) are more averse
than debtors to banking crises is intuitive, especially
in the early nineteenth century U.S. context where (as
I discuss below) debtors were able to get political
protection from their creditors during a crisis. Never-
theless, it would be desirable to have an economic model
to provide a foundation for the premise and also direct
evidence in favor of the premise. Since I discuss infla-
tion consequences of the U.S. Bank in the next section,
as well as banking-crisis consequences, the assertion
in the second premise regarding banking crises is not
absolutely required for the analysis of the U.S. Bank
to be sound.63 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The Second Bank of the United States
The premises discussed in the previous two sec-
tions seem to fit the Second Bank of the United States
well, and they provide a quite distinct insight from
the conventional analysis. The U.S. Bank was origi-
nally proposed to Congress in 1814. Congress granted
a charter in 1816 to operate for a period of 20 years.
The bank began to operate in 1817 and was convert-
ed into a Pennsylvania state-chartered bank in 1836,
after Congress declined to renew its federal charter.
The U.S. Bank was conceived in an environment
of financial crisis. The United States declared war on
England in 1812 and narrowly survived the war, which
ended with a negotiated peace in 1814. The U.S. gov-
ernment bore extraordinary war expenditures. At the
same time, tax revenues (principally import duties on
goods imported from England during peacetime) plunged.
The U.S. financial system was based on state-chartered
banks, which expanded their note issue and subsequent-
ly were unable to redeem their notes for specie. Be-
cause these notes were not redeemable and suffered
high inflation, and because the notes of most banks were
not accepted in trade except close to their location of
issue, it would have been fruitless for the government
to accept them in payment of taxes. Since taxpayers
could not obtain specie, they could not pay their taxes.
In large part because of credit risk due to this situation,
even short-term government debt sold at a substantial
discount (Wright, 1941, pp. 276–279).
The conventional analysis is that, as an economic
institution, the U.S. Bank was disastrously managed
in its first two years but, on the whole, very capably
managed thereafter. This abrupt change reflected a
change in leadership.10 The president of the bank dur-
ing those first two years, William Jones, was essentially
a political choice—preferred for the position by the
U.S. president and secretary of the Treasury (James
Madison and Alexander Dallas, who appointed five
of the bank’s directors and apparently lobbied actively
to influence the election of the remaining 20), but had
neither the experience nor the ability to be a capable
and judicious banker. In contrast, each of the two sub-
sequent presidents, Langdon Cheves and Nicholas
Biddle, was elected by the bank’s directors with the
expectation that he would act as a capable and judicious
banker, and each amply justified that expectation by
his performance.
The U.S. Bank operated in an economy in which
there were already over 200 state-chartered banks
(Wright, 1941, p. 258). Indeed, one of the main motives
for establishing the U.S. Bank was to impose discipline
on the state banks. Both impressionistic and quantita-
tive studies have concluded that the U.S. Bank acted
in a non-predatory way toward the state banks, although
it did constrain their profits by imposing discipline and
by competing vigorously. However, state bankers com-
plained strenuously that the conduct of the U.S. Bank
was unfair to them and contrary to the public interest.
These bankers’ complaints and their view of the role
of the U.S. Bank were taken seriously by citizens, es-
pecially in the southern and western states, who sup-
ported the sustained and aggressive campaign of Andrew
Jackson’s administration against the U.S. Bank. That
campaign, which reached its peak during Jackson’s
second term (beginning in 1833), included withdraw-
ing the federal government’s deposits, refusing to ac-
cept notes of the U.S. Bank in payment of taxes, and
an intense and ultimately successful political effort to
prevent renewal of the bank’s federal charter.
Those southern and western states were the ones
in which it was most common for banks to issue a greater
value of notes than they were able to redeem for specie.
They were also the states where, during the Panic of
1819, laws were passed that impaired banks’ ability
to take possession of collateral and sell it to discharge
loans that were in default. These two facts suggest
that in the southern and western states, debtors were
politically decisive, and that those debtors favored or
at least tolerated a policy regime that permitted bank-
ers aggressively to expand the money supply.
As a political institution, the U.S. Bank was one of
the most intense objects of controversy in U.S. history.
The original charter was a subject of extended debate
throughout a two-year period, during which seven at-
tempts were made to pass it. One of these attempts ended
in a presidential veto. The original petition to Congress
for a bank to be chartered had been submitted by the
New York business community and received strong
support from business leaders in Philadelphia, where
the bank was ultimately headquartered. New York and
Philadelphia, the two primary U.S. financial centers,
were located in the states where it is reasonable to sup-
pose that creditors were most politically dominant, as
they likely were to some extent in most of the north-
eastern states. The petition emphasized that the U.S.
Bank would provide a sound national currency, disci-
pline the state banks (which in some states would other-
wise continue to issue unsound currency), and provide
a serviceable medium for payment of taxes so that the
federal government could balance its budget and repay
its debt. That is, the petitioners from these creditor-
dominated states supported a contractionary monetary
and fiscal regime that would be expected to produce
relatively high real interest rates.
However, when the charter ultimately did pass,
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western states.11 That is, support came primarily from
the debtor-dominated states that later were most criti-
cal of the U.S. Bank’s conduct.
The conventional analysis of the politics of the
original U.S. Bank charter emphasizes considerations
of party and ideology, which are only indirectly relat-
ed to the economic function of the bank. The fact that
legislators’ votes were determined as much by their
regions as by their parties casts doubt on that analysis.12
At the same time, there are three puzzles that are chal-
lenges for the explanation that I am proposing. Why did
debtor-dominated states support a bank proposed by
creditor-dominated states? Why did creditor-dominat-
ed states withdraw their support for a bank that they
had proposed? Finally, why did the debtor-dominated
states quickly become dissatisfied with the bank?
If the premises enumerated in the previous two
sections are correct, then one can resolve all three of
these puzzles by paying attention to the decentralized
corporate structure of the U.S. Bank, which made the
U.S. Bank itself and the U.S. banking system (consist-
ing of both the U.S. Bank and the state banks) a divided
banking system. As discussed earlier, a divided bank-
ing system has two equilibriums that differ in their levels
of money creation and exposure to banking panics. As
discussed in the previous section, these differences be-
tween the equilibriums can result in differences between
their distributive implications. While the original pe-
tition to Congress to charter a bank did not envision
branches (and thus did envision a unified banking
system with a dominant, centrally managed bank at its
head), most of the draft charters subsequently consid-
ered did authorize the U.S. Bank to establish branches.
By early 1817, when the bank went into operation,
16 branches had been established in addition to the
head office in Philadelphia.13 Each branch had its own
board of directors, whom the charter specified were to
be appointed by the parent board in Philadelphia. A
branch board was to elect one of its members as branch
president. Each branch had a cashier, an employee who
managed its day-to-day business, whom the charter also
specified was to be appointed by the parent board.
The initial rationale for authorizing the establish-
ment of branches was to impose discipline on state banks
operating in markets far from the head office and to
create a uniform, nationwide currency. In order to
achieve the latter goal fully, notes issued by any branch
would have to be payable specie at any other branch.
Preferably other branch obligations, including drafts
and inland bills of exchange, should also be payable.
While the charter did not require the bank to operate
according to this rule, that was the expectation of the
U.S. Bank’s initial proponents. In principle, the charter
enabled the head office to limit the value of notes issued
by the branches because the paper notes themselves had
to be obtained from the cashier in Philadelphia. How-
ever, this arrangement was not self-enforcing. Rather,
it placed the burden on the cashier and, ultimately,
the directors of the head office to monitor note issuance
by branches and to constrain the decisions of branch
directors who might be politically influential. More-
over, it did not address the problem of limiting other
sorts of branch obligations, which were more difficult
to monitor than note issuance because they required
detailed knowledge of the operating procedures of each
branch. Even an experienced cashier in Philadelphia
had difficulty in this regard. (Catterall, 1902, p. 395.)
I have already mentioned William Jones, the first
president of the U.S. Bank. He was primarily a poli-
tician. He lacked the experience or ability to head the
nation’s largest bank and to play a role akin to that of
a central banker. As a businessman, he had gone into
bankruptcy. He had been regarded as incompetent dur-
ing a brief tenure as Treasury secretary. In fact, the bank’s
original directors shared these traits on the whole. They
appointed branch directors who, as a group, did not
exhibit high character, competence, or political inde-
pendence. (Catterall, 1902, p. 32.) With such leaders,
and without close and competent central oversight, a
number of branches located primarily in debtor-dom-
inated states engaged in dangerously expansive note
issuance and lending.14 That is, a policy regime went
into effect that closely resembled the static, high-in-
flation equilibrium discussed earlier in most respects.
These considerations suggest that the character
of the directors and officers was crucial to determining
whether the static, high-inflation equilibrium or the
dynamic, low-inflation equilibrium would result from
the founding of the U.S. Bank with its decentralized
corporate form. Evidently the representatives of the
creditor-dominated, northeastern states initially believed
that those directors and officers would be conservative
bankers who would implement the low-inflation equi-
librium. It is plausible that, sometime between 1814
and 1816, both they and the representatives of the debt-
or-dominated, southern and western states changed
their beliefs. They came to recognize that a combina-
tion of direct government appointment of some of the
Philadelphia directors and politically influenced elec-
tion of the remaining directors would likely produce
a board with the characteristics of the actual original
board, and that the head-office board would then ap-
point branch boards that would be inclined to behave
in accordance with the high-inflation equilibrium. This
supposition provides an explanation of why many legis-
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their support for the U.S. Bank, as well as why many
southern- and western-state legislators ultimately did
vote to charter the bank. That is, the supposition re-
solves the first and second of my puzzles.
Let’s turn now to the third puzzle: Why the south-
ern and western states’ citizens views shifted toward
opposition to the U.S. Bank, particularly after the equi-
librium initially supported by that institutional frame-
work turned out to be the one that they had hoped for.
A conventional view, to which I present an alter-
native or at least a supplement, attributes the shift to
the fact that the U.S. Bank was required by its charter
to redeem its notes for specie, so inflation could not go
on indefinitely. Beginning in mid-1818, the bank was
forced to demand payment of loans rather than renewing
them, in order to obtain specie with which to make
redemptions. To the extent that loans were repaid in state
banknotes that the U.S. Bank redeemed, the balance-sheet
pressure was also partly transmitted to state banks. The
resulting contraction of credit was widely thought to
have contributed to, or at least increased the hardship
produced by, the recessionary Panic of 1819. Further-
more, when Langdon Cheves became president of the
bank at the beginning of 1819, he forbade the branches
to issue notes and instructed the head office not to pur-
chase bills of exchange issued by the branches (Catterall,
1902, p. 70). The consequences of this policy were felt
most heavily by farmers and other users of bank credit.
Thus, according to this view, debtors turned against
the bank because they blamed it for causing them un-
necessary hardship during and after the panic.
This is a very plausible view. It is consistent with
documentary evidence about when and where sentiment
turned against the U.S. Bank. It is also consistent with
the intuitive idea that people whose lives had been ruined
or severely disrupted by being held to the harsh terms
of a contract in circumstances for which it was not de-
signed (that is, whose loan defaults were due to excep-
tional macroeconomic conditions rather than to their
own indolence or improvidence) would become im-
placable enemies of the institution enforcing the con-
tract. Here are two weaknesses of the view, although
these considerations are far from being decisive refu-
tations of it. First, in a number of the debtor-dominat-
ed states, laws were passed that effectively protected
defaulting debtors from action by their creditors.15 It
is probable that, once such a law had been passed, banks
largely left defaulting debtors alone rather than taking
costly, unproductive actions against them. Thus, to the
extent that such a law had been passed promptly, there
would be relatively few debtors who were directly, per-
sonally harmed by their banks. Second, the view does not
explain why debtors should have strong animosity to
the U.S. Bank as an institution, rather than to the of-
ficers who had caused the difficulty by inept or cor-
rupt management. In particular, after President Jones
had resigned in disgrace at the beginning of 1819 and
President Cheves had subsequently forced many of
Jones’s subordinates out of office and prosecuted
several of them, why was there still animosity to the
bank after 1822, when the Panic of 1819 had waned
and Nicholas Biddle had replaced Cheves as president?
Why was animosity not directed exclusively toward
Jones and perhaps Cheves (who initially had no choice
but to continue the contractionary policies adopted to
keep the bank solvent at the end of Jones’s tenure),
rather than toward the bank and its newly elected pres-
ident?16 Of course, if one believes that public animosi-
ty is frequently misdirected at institutions and public
figures whose actual conduct has been creditable, then
one will not lose much confidence in the convention-
al explanation of the bank’s fall from popularity on
account of that having happened here. In summary, the
conventional view explains well why support for the
U.S. Bank eroded in the southern and western states.
Nevertheless, the contrast between the static and
dynamic equilibriums of a divided banking system sug-
gests an additional explanation. Cheves and Biddle may
have accomplished a shift from a high-inflation to a
low-inflation equilibrium. If so, then it is obvious why
debtors who had supported chartering the U.S. Bank
in the expectation of an expansionary outcome retract-
ed that support in 1819. It is certain that the money
stock per capita steadily decreased to a stable level
attained by the late 1820s. Catterall (1902, p. 444) cites
a congressional document that calculates the amount
of money (including state banknotes, U.S. Bank notes,
and specie) in circulation per capita as having been $11
in 1816, $7.75 in 1819, $6 in 1829, and $6.35 between
1829 and 1834. It is clear that the gradual decline, on
average, in circulation per capita during 1819–29 is at-
tributable to the Cheves–Biddle regime. Credit for the
steeper decline during 1816–19 cannot be attributed
as surely, since Jones had to curtail the bank’s opera-
tions in the second half of 1818 and then the bank’s
transition from Jones to Cheves as president occurred
in January 1819. Both the description of the U.S. Bank’s
own operations during 1817–18 and the evidence that
state banknotes continued to inflate during that period
suggest that most of the 1816–19 decline in circula-
tion per capita probably occurred in 1819.
Changes that Cheves and Biddle made in operating
and management procedures can be viewed as attempts
to alter or mitigate the features of the U.S. Bank’s cor-
porate structure that constituted a divided banking
system. First of all, Cheves’ policy in 1819 established66 1Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
the precedent that the bank’s management had the op-
tion not to permit notes of one branch to be presented
for specie payment at another branch. Moreover, he
required each branch not to pay bills of exchange is-
sued by another branch, unless the issuing branch had
made an inter-branch deposit from which the payment
could be made (Catterall, 1902, p. 76). To address the
problem of branch interrelatedness at its root, he as-
signed a notional capital to each branch and required
prompt payment of interbranch debt, so that each branch
had to stand financially on its own rather than being
a free rider on the others and the head office (Catterall,
1902, pp. 63, 76). Biddle reduced the autonomy and
privacy of the branches by having the cashier of each
branch report directly to the head office, rather than
delegating the supervision of the cashier substantially
to the branch president as before, and empowering
Philadelphia directors resident in branch cities to attend
the board meetings of those branches. He also instituted
a practice of filling branch cashier positions by pro-
moting seasoned Philadelphia employees and avoiding
moving people to cities where they had formerly lived
(Catterall, 1902, pp. 102–104).
In a decentralized economy in which a static equilib-
rium had been in effect for a period of time and, subse-
quently, a dynamic equilibrium had been in effect, one
would expect to observe two distinctions between the
earlier and later periods. First, policy would be less ex-
pansionary on average during the later period. Second,
there would be brief periods of some sort of financial
disturbance (such as high-inflation episodes in dynamic
equilibrium) in which the equilibrium had apparently
broken down and then been restored. These episodes
would occur in circumstances where it might appear as
though banks (or bank branches) could be overextending,
but without direct evidence of inappropriate decisions
or conduct. These comparisons between the two peri-
ods are predictions that follow from a supposition that
an equilibrium shift has taken place. Fulfillment of both
predictions should be taken as evidence of a shift.
To examine the U.S. economy during the existence
of the U.S. Bank in these terms, we might specify the
first period as having occurred during 1817–18 and the
second period during 1819–32. This specification rec-
ognizes that effects of the Jackson administration’s active
hostility to the bank and of the bank’s forceful strategic
reaction overshadowed the fundamental characteristics
of the bank’s equilibrium after 1832. The discussion of
money stock per capita above provides some evidence
that the first prediction from an equilibrium shift was
fulfilled. Regarding the second prediction, there were
episodes of banking disruption in 1828 and particularly
in 1832 that fit it well (Catterall, 1902, pp. 135–137).
This evidence seems favorable toward, albeit not conclu-
sive of, a shift from a static equilibrium to a dynamic
equilibrium coinciding with Jones’s resignation and
Cheves’ election as president of the U.S. Bank.
Conclusion
The Second Bank of the United States was an in-
stitution of first-rank importance, both politically and
economically, during the early nineteenth century.
This article has brought recent contributions to the theo-
ry of industrial organization and monetary economics
to bear, in order to link the political and economic
aspects of its history more closely and insightfully.
The main, albeit tentative, conclusion of the study is
that conflict between debtors and creditors regarding
the U.S. bank and its policies may have played a
larger role in the political fortunes of the bank than
historians have generally understood.
NOTES
1The First Bank of the United States (1791–1811) was a previous
economic and political experiment with a national bank.
2A legacy of the Second Bank of the United States is McCulloch v.
Maryland (McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 1819), a case that
became one of the pillars of U.S. constitutional law. The Supreme
Court ruled that the Constitution should be read as granting “im-
plied powers”—powers that are reasonable means for exercising
narrower powers explicitly enumerated in the Constitution and that
are not explicitly prohibited—to the federal government. From
this general principle and the specific premise that a national bank
was a reasonable means to exercise explicit federal powers such
as collecting taxes, borrowing money, regulating commerce, and
so forth, the court inferred that the charter of the Second Bank of
the United States was constitutional.
3An econometric study of the U.S. Bank by Highfield, O’Hara,
and Woods (1991) supports previous historians’ impressionistic
conclusions to this effect. Nevertheless, there was one very impor-
tant state (New York, where Governor Martin Van Buren was a
national leader of opposition) in which state banks were limited
by charter from offering loans at as low a rate as the U.S. Bank
could offer (Catterall, 1902, p. 166). So its avoidance of predatory
conduct did not necessarily mean that the U.S. Bank was not a
genuine threat to state banks.
4Aizenman (1989) derives this proposition in a model in which real
money balances are assumed to be an argument of agents’ utility
function (or, more generally, an exogenous demand function for
money is assumed). Hørder (1997) derives the proposition in an
overlapping-generations model of fiat money.
5Zarazaga (1992, 1993) derives this proposition in a dynamic ver-
sion of Aizenman’s model.67 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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6This exemplifies a more general phenomenon known to econo-
mists as “prisoner’s dilemma” and the “tragedy of the commons,”
on account of early examples that were studied.
7The following discussion presents the intuition behind a result of
Green and Porter (1984) that Zarazaga used. Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti (1990) provide an improved, but more technically de-
manding, result.
8I am grateful to Anna Paulson for pointing out the relevance of
Hendricks’ study.
9Bayes’ Theorem states that an observation (such as Hendricks’ find-
ings) provides support for a hypothesis (such as the first premise)
if the hypothesis raises the conditional likelihood of the observation
(as this paragraph argues that the first premise does for Hendricks’
findings).
10The following facts, and the other facts in this section for which
explicit citations are not given, are documented by Catterall (1902).
11The New England and middle states (New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Delaware) voted 45–35 against the charter in
the House of Representatives, while the southern and western states
voted 45–26 for it. The Senate vote was 22–21, with more than
half of the votes for the charter coming from the South and West
(Hammond, 1957, p. 240).
12Crucial support for the charter came from defecting members of
the Federalist party (Hammond, 1957, p. 241).
13A total of 28 branches were eventually established, several of
which were closed while the bank still had its federal charter.
14Some of this activity, particularly at the Baltimore branch, involved
transactions that were outright inappropriate and even fraudulent.
However, the extent of this activity and its relative concentration
in the southern and western branches suggest that it was an equi-
librium phenomenon rather than solely a manifestation of individual
weakness or greed.
15Such laws were passed in Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Missouri,
Illinois, and Indiana (Catterall, 1902, p. 83). Although these laws
superficially seem to be a time-inconsistent obstruction of volun-
tary agreements, there is a good case that their passage was actu-
ally efficient from an ex ante perspective. Green and Oh (1992)
and Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) have made this case.
16Wright (1953) documents that, even before Cheves became presi-
dent, some contractionary actions were taken on Biddle’s recommen-
dation that were necessary to correct Jones’s mismanagement.
However, Wright notes that Biddle managed to give this advice
without taking a publicly visible role.